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TAX COLLECTION FROM ESTATES
OF NONRESIDENTS
ROBERT WHITMAN*
All Americans and many aliens are subject to United States taxes., Con-
gressional power to impose tax is premised on the benefits this country renders
a taxpayer. Taxing power is not measured, and taxes are not imposed, with
regard to the power of the Internal Revenue Service, working through its
overseas arm, the Office of International Operations (OO),2 to collect tax.
Under the Expatriation Act,3 Congress recently extended the incidence of
United States taxation to individuals who have renounced their citizenship
in order to escape taxation. However, no accompanying legislation was pro-
posed in order to assist 010 in the collection of the tax from such persons,
who typically have withdrawn virtually all of their assets from this country.
Although we say a tax is owing, there are limitations on 010 collection
activities abroad and United States courts may lack the jurisdiction to reach
a foreign delinquent taxpayer. Unless 010 is dearly aware of the distinction
between the right to impose a tax and the right to collect it, collection pro-
cedures and litigation practices will not be carefully thought out, balanced
and controlled, and an all-out attempt at aggressive collection by 010 can
be expected in every case. If 010 is unable to react properly to the unique
problems which foreigners face, the United States cannot expect its citizens
to receive better treatment abroad and international cooperation in tax col-
lection will suffer as a result.
The tax collection problems faced by OI when it is dealing with a non-
resident without assets in the United States are due in large part to the inter-
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Connecticut School of Law. In
connection with the preparation of this article, the author has engaged in informal con-
versations and correspondence with members of the Internal Revenue Service, counsel
for several New York banks, and Canadian attorneys. Copies of correspondence and
notes on oral conversations have been placed on file with the library of The University
of Connecticut School of Law. Professor M. Carr Ferguson, New York University Law
School, has reviewed drafts of this work and provided the author with many valuable
comments and suggestions.
For a recent survey of the field of international tax evasion published after the
completion of this article, see Note, Transnational Tax Evasion of United States Tax-
ation, 81 HtAv. L. REv. 876 (1968).
1. Both citizenship and residence are touchstones for application of the federal tax
law. In general, all citizens and resident aliens are subject to tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b)
(1956). So long as citizenship is maintained, tax cannot be avoided by absence from the
United States for long periods of time, lack of activity within this country, or a with-
drawal of all domestic assets.
2. On the development, organization and duties of 010, see Fox, Office of Interna-
tional Operations: What It Does and How It Fionictions, 22 3. TAx. 162 (1965).
3. INrT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 877, 2107. On the need for intentional and voluntary
renunciation of citizenship in order to bring about expatriation, see Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253 (1967) ; Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). For a discussion of the
meaning of the term "citizenship" for the purpose of applying the federal estate tax,
see I G. MERTEN, LAW OF FEDERAL Gn=r AND ESTATE TAXATION § 3.09 (1959).
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nationally accepted rule of law-adhered to by the United States-that the
courts of one country will not enforce the revenue laws or claims of another.
4
This rule remains largely unaffected by a small number of rarely used recip-
rocal tax treaty provisions providing for mutual tax collection assistance
abroad.6 In absence of treaty relief, a nonresident with no assets and no
contacts in the United States is beyond the control of 010, and he may with
impunity refuse to pay taxes which Congress has declared to be owing. Given
such a situation there is no need to examine the propriety of OIO's collection
procedures or the jurisdiction of United States courts; the simple fact is that
since tax judgments are not enforceable abroad, collection from the delinquent
taxpayer will not be possible.
However, when the taxpayer dies a fiduciary will be appointed to admin-
ister his estate. If the fiduciary can be reached, it becomes meaningful to con-
sider the collection procedures available to 010 and the jurisdiction of our
4. United States v. Harden, 41 D.L.R.2d 721 (Can. 1963), noted in 77 Htnv. L. REV.
1327 (1964).
5. See 77 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1330 (1964). See also Eichel, Administrative Aspects
of the Pervention and Control of International Tax Evasion, 20 U. MIvi L. RFv. 25, 54
(1965); Newman, Tax Administration in Striped Trousers: The International Opera-
tions Program of the Internal Revenue Service, 12 TAx L. av. 171, 208 (1957).
6. See Newman, supra note 5, at 205-08. Tax treaties are negotiated through the
State Department by the International Tax Relations Division and by the Treasury
Department. There are presently twenty-two tax treaties in force. Treaties are entered
into primarily to relieve taxpayers of the burden of double taxation. However, an impor-
tant by-product of the treaties is the provision for exchange of information. See Surrey,
International Tax Conventions: How They Operate and What They Accomplish, 23
J. TAx. 364, 366 (1965).
The United States has four tax treaties in force with foreign countries (Denmark,
France, Netherlands, and Sweden) containing general provisions for mutual assistance
in collection of taxes. Under these treaties if a final determination of a foreign taxpayer's
liability is made in the United States, application can be made to the country in which
the delinquent taxpayer is residing to have that country collect the tax under its normal
collection procedures. Similarly, that country can solicit aid in the United States in order
to collect taxes due to it from residents of the United States.
The collection provisions in the treaties with Denmark, France and the Netherlands
are limited in that the country requesting assistance will not receive help from the
country in which the taxpayer resides if the taxpayer is a citizen of the country in which
he resides. The treaty with Sweden is more limited in that the country requesting
assistance can only seek assistance in collecting taxes owed to it by its own citizens
residing abroad.
The treaty restrictions might present a barrier to the collection of taxes owed by a
deceased American citizen who had resided abroad if the decedent's executor is a national
of the foreign country in which the decedent had resided. Presumably, however, a pro-
ceeding against the decedent's estate would be considered equivalent to a proceeding
against an American rather than against the foreign fiduciary.
Fifteen other tax treaties also contain provisions for mutual assistance in collection,
but these are restricted to collections which insure that exemptions and reduced taxes
established in the treaties are not enjoyed by those not entitled to them. For a general
discussion of tax treaties, see Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role
in Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUvGERs L. Ray. 428, 451 (1963).
The extradition treaties entered into by the United States do not include tax evasion
as an extraditable offense. Yet, many of these treaties do provide for extradition for
perjury, and section 7206(1) of the Code, which prohibits false returns, has been held
to be a "perjury" statute. Kolaski v. United States, 362 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1966).
It has also been held that falsification of income tax returns will subject persons to the
general federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964). United States v. Noveck, 273
U.S. 202 (1927).
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courts. One purpose of this article is to point up the difficulties that can be
encountered by 010 in the application of its collection procedures against the
foreign fiduciary of a deceased nonresident taxpayer's estate and to examine
the dilemma which the fiduciary may face.
The need to reconcile competing goals of 010 will also be considered.
Arguably only a rigid and aggressive enforcement policy can deter tax evasion
abroad. If there is no question as to liability on the basis of the broad language
of the Code and the Regulations, 0IO should attempt to collect the full
amount of taxes, interest and penalties. On the other hand, 0IO must be
sensitive to the need to balance its tax collection goals with the need for
cooperation and restraint in tax collection in the international area. As the
director of 010 has noted:
What we visualize in the international area is the world wide appli-
cation of methods and systems which have been developed and
applied within nations. This will demand even greater cooperation
among nations; and between the Service, the international enter-
prise, and the jet-age citizen. 7
This is especially true when a foreign fiduciary is involved; for in that situ-
ation problems are particularly likely to arise.
I. THE IMPACT OF DEATH ON TAX COLLECTION AGAINST
NONRESIDENTS
Although 010 activities are hampered by inability to sue in foreign
courts or to use the extensive tax collection machinery available to agents
in the United States s while a delinquent taxpayer remains alive 010 does
have compensating aids at its command.9 The taxpayer's assets in the United
States can be seized and funds or other property which he sends back to the
United States can be intercepted.10 The taxpayer may no longer be welcome
7. Fox, Functioning of the Office of International Operations, N.Y.U. 22nd INST. ON
FED. TAX. 735, 748 (1964).
8. Baiter, How the Offlce of International Operations Enforces U.S. Taxes in For-
cign Countries, 22 J. TAX. 356, 359, 360 (1965).
9. Newman, supra note 5, at 202-04.
10. The Code provides several alternative methods for the collection of revenue.
Sections 6321 and 6332 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provide that at the time an
assessment is made a lien arises on "all property and rights to property" belonging to a
taxpayer who has refused or neglected to pay any tax. The Service is authorized to
collect the tax by levy against all property or rights to property either belonging to the
taxpayer or on which there is a lien. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6331(a). The Code also
provides for resort to the courts if necessary. Id. § 7403(a).
In addition to the general lien for unpaid taxes, special liens arise with respect to the
estate and gift tax. Id. § 6324. The special lien for estate tax attaches at the date of the
decedent's death to every part of his gross estate. With a minor exception, all persons
receiving property includible in the estate are personally liable for the estate tax to the
extent of the value of such property on the date of the decedent's death. The special
lien for gift tax attaches upon all gifts made during the calendar year for the amount of
gift tax imposed on gifts during that year. If the gift tax is not paid when due, the
donee of any gift becomes liable for the tax to the extent of the gift received by him.
The special estate or gift tax lien is enforceable for a period of 10 years unless the tax is
1968] 1051
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at the United States embassy or legation; his relations with a foreign govern-
ment friendly to the United States may be strained. Foreign officials who
learn that 010 is proceedings against an American residing abroad may com-
mence a tax investigation of their own. In addition, if the taxpayer returns
to this country, he may be forced to pay a heavy price in interest and penalties
for his delinquency. 1 He is well aware that he is risking criminal prosecution
for a willful failure to comply with the tax law.' 2 It is therefore probably safe
to say that, even when residing abroad, the persons upon whom taxes are
imposed remain quite sensitive to the effective tax collection procedures which
can be exerted on them from the United States. In effect, the delinquent tax-
payer must choose between completely divorcing himself from all contacts
with the United States or paying the taxes due. By and large, nonresidents
can be counted on voluntarily to comply with our tax laws once their delin-
quency has been discovered and pressure has been applied by 010 so long
as the taxpayer is unwilling to sever all of his contacts with this country.
Even if a delinquent taxpayer does break all contacts with the United
States during his life, his death brings a drastic change. The struggle with
the taxpayer is terminated, and the 010 must deal with a new party, the
decedent's executor or administrator. If the taxpayer has resided abroad for
many years and all or a substantial part of his assets are located outside of
the United States, the decedent's representative is likely to be a foreign fidu-
ciary. While the fiduciary will be located abroad, it may have contacts with
the United States which can serve as a basis for jurisdiction. This is especially
true where a corporate fiduciary such as a bank is involved.
Such a fiduciary is situated in a new position and thus possesses a wholly
new outlook. The foreign fiduciary is a national of another country and owes
no allegiance to the United States. To it, declarations of the United States
Congress and the courts of the United States with regard to the imposition
and the collection of taxes are not supreme. It will look to its native country
for the determination and declaration of its rights and duties. Much of the
leverage which 010 agents had against the decedent is inapplicable against
paid in full. An estate tax lien may be divested, however, from that portion of the gross
estate used to pay claims against the estate and administration expenses and, in specified
cases, from that part of the property which has been transferred to bona fide purchaser,
mortgagee, or pledgee for an adequate and full consideration, but a like lien is substituted
upon the consideration received. Treas. Reg. § 301.6324-1 (a) (2) (i), (iii) (1954).
The Service may effectively assert a lien against all property found within the
jurisdiction of the United States in order to satisfy amounts owing, and the concept of
property "within the jurisdiction of the United States" is a very broad one. Compare
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. United States, 331 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1964) (tax
lien enforced on taxpayer's endowment policies although taxpayer had disappeared)
with United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) (lien restricted to cash surrender values
of policies at death of insured).
11. Failure to file returns and pay taxes due will obligate the taxpayer for all taxes
due, interest at 675 per annum under section 6601 of the Code, and penalties of up to
25%o of the tax for failure to file a return under section 6651 or 50% of the tax for fraud
under section 6653
12. NT. Rv. CODE of 1954 §§ 7201, 7203, 7206, 7207, 7210.
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the fiduciary as it will not be moved by the same pressures and motives which
concerned the decedent. Moreover, while the decedent's motive may simply
have been tax evasion, this may not (and probably will not) be the moving
force behind the foreign fiduciary's refusal to pay taxes which are said to be
due. The fiduciary owes its paramount loyalty to the beneficiaries of the
estate, and its primary duty is to preserve the estate for their benefit. The
fiduciary may come to find that while under the Internal Revenue Code and
Regulations the decedent is said to be subject to tax by the United States,
the estate has either no assets or insufficient assets falling under United States
tax enforcement powers. Likewise, the fiduciary may be uncertain as to
whether it is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States courts. Assertion
of jurisdiction by United States courts over the fiduciary or the estate might
well be rejected by a foreign court. And even if jurisdiction were found to
exist, the beneficiaries might demand that taxes which cannot be enforced
not be paid. All of these possibilities contribute to the uncertainty of the
fiduciary's position.
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR TESTING TAx COLLECTION
For the purpose of testing the tax collection powers of 010, rare (but
not unlikely) circumstances are assumed. The hypothetical situation would
be as follows: a foreign fiduciary has been appointed as the executor of the
will of a nonresident. The estate and the decedent are subject to taxation
under the laws of the United States. The estate has little or no assets within
the United States which are available to satisfy the taxes owing. For con-
venience, such an estate will be referred to hereafter as a "foreign asset, for-
eign fiduciary estate."
OIO's initial problem will be to discover the existence of such an estate.13
For example, in the Omar case, 14 010 was not aware of the existence of the
13. See Eichel, supra note 5, at 29. In addition to information gathering techniques
used domestically, international tax treaties aid 010 in finding delinquent taxpayers
residing abroad. Between treaty countries there is a constant exchange of data. See
Newman, supra note 5, at 206, 207. If, for instance, an American decedent died a resident
or domiciliary of Canada, his executor would file papers in connection with the Canadian
administration of his estate and, pursuant to the treaty provisions (13 U.S.T. 382, Arts.
VII-IX (1962), T.I.A.S. No. 4995), Canadian officials would forward pertinent informa-
tion to 010. Even in a nontreaty country, such as Mexico, informal relations between
the foreign taxing agency and 010 agents have grown up, and the practice of exchanging
information is prevalent. See Baiter, vupra note 8, at 360 n.18; Newman, supra note 5, at
208.
Presence of a nonresident decedent's property ithin the United States may bring
tax delinquencies to light upon the death of the individual since there are special provi-
sions in the Regulations designed to bring forth this information. Treas. Reg. § 301.6325-1
(b) (4)-(c) (2) (1954). Under threat of personal liability, any person in the United
States in possession of a decedent's property is required to assume the reporting role of
an executor where no fiduciary is appointed or acting within the United States. Treas.
Reg. §§ 20.2002-1, 20.2203-1 (1958). Consequently 010 often receives unsolicited reports
from United States banks and brokerage houses ith which a nonresident decedent had
an account.
14. United States v. Omar, S.A., 210 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd sub
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foreign corporation, against which it ultimately assessed more than nineteen
million dollars in delinquent taxes, until the corporation filed a tax return
requesting a small tax refund.15 Once this existence is known, OIO's basic
problem will be to establish quasi in rein jurisdiction over the assets of the
estate, or to gain personal jurisdiction over someone who can be held liable
for the taxes due.
The Code and Regulations speak in broad terms, constantly referring
to "any person," "any books, papers, records" and "all property." If taken
literally, the language of the Code and Regulations could be thought of as
actually determining OIO's right to impose obligations and sanctions on
foreigners without regard to their citizenship, residence, or jurisdictional
contacts with the United States. Yet the Service has never fully pressed such
an interpretation of the Code and the Regulations. 1 In practice, it is the rare
case in which the Service finds that jurisdictional problems block the use of
its collection procedures. It is an even rarer case in which the Service meets
any real opposition to its demands. However, due to the potency of its normal
collection procedures, 010 agents in the field may not be adequately aware
of the jurisdictional limitations on the assertion of tax claims in court.
Special procedures have not been adopted by 010 for handling a foreign
asset, foreign fiduciary estate because one does not present itself often. Ac-
cordingly, if such a situation comes to light, 010 attempts to enforce its tax
claims immediately. Action by 010 can be attempted along one or all of three
distinct routes: (1) by proceeding directly against the fiduciary, as the repre-
sentative of the estate, thereby looking to the assets of the estate for satis-
i zo. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd en bane,
325 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd, 379 U.S. 378 (1965). For discussion of this case, see
pt. III, section A of this article infra.
15. See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 385 (1965).
16. The Service has tried to equate the power to impose and assess taxes and juris-
diction to collect them. See United States v. Montreal Trust Company, 358 F.2d 239,
249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966):
Before the District Court the government bluntly asserted that "The Commis-
sioner assessed the tax in the State of New York where the tax accrued and
there is no reason in the world why that determination should not satisfy juris-
diction here," referring to jurisdiction over a man who never comes to this
State of New York physically, who never sets foot in a hotel in New York[but who] may be served in the rice paddy in Indochina. Statement by Govern-
ment Counsel to District Court, September 10, 1964. The district court, 235
F. Supp. 345, 349, rejected this "presumption of jurisdiction from assessment"
argument of the government, stating "Plaintiff's final contention is that even
though there is no such evidence ['that Klein, as an individual, in 1944, 1945 and
1946, transacted business in New York'], such a finding can be based upon the
mere fact that the Internal Revenue Service assessed income taxes against Klein
for those years." No pertinent authority is cited for this proposition and in my
opinion it is without merit.... If plaintiff's contention were sound, no hearing
on the question of fact would ever be necessary, and all that the government
would need to do to sustain the service, at least in the first instance, would be to
produce a certified copy of the tax assessment. I am unwilling thus to extend the
presumption referred to in [Halle v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir.
1949, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949, 70 S. Ct. 485, 94 L. Ed. 586 (1950)].
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faction of the taxes due;17 (2) by proceeding against the fiduciary, in its
individual capacity on the theory of personal liability, thereby looking to the
fiduciary's personal assets to satisfy the tax debt;18 or (3) by proceeding
against any transferee, 19 to the extent he has received the assets of the estate.
When the foreign fiduciary of a foreign asset estate hears from 010,
it must decide whether it will cooperate with the United States and satisfy
the taxes said to be due.20 In making this decision it faces numerous problems.
17. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1958).
18. See 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1964):
Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who pays, in whole
or in part, any debt due the person or estate for whom or for which he acts
before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from such person
and estate, shall become answerable in his own person and estate to the extent
of such payments for the debts so due the United States, or for so much thereof
as may remain due and unpaid.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1958) explains that as used in the statute the word "debt"
includes a beneficiary's distributive share of an estate, and the Supreme Court has held
that the phrase "debts due to the United States" includes tax obligations not yet reduced
to judgment or assessments so long as the executor has been made aware of the obligation.
Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926). There is some support in the cases for the
proposition that section 192 is applicable only to insolvent estates on the theory that the
section was enacted to implement an earlier act granting the United States status as a
preferred creditor when a taxpayer is insolvent or an estate is inadequate to satisfy all
creditors. For a close analysis of the section which concludes that a distribution which
itself creates insolvency is probably sufficient to support liability, see Ferguson, The
Fiduciary's Personal Liability for Federal Taxes of the Decedent and His Estate: The
Problems of Distribution and Partial Distribution, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1185,
1197 (1967).
19. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6901.
20. Under the Code, where tax liability exists, foreign fiduciaries of nonresident
decedents' estates are expected to, and by and large do, comply voluntarily with our tax
laws. Assuming liability for United States estate taxes is accepted by a foreign fiduciary,
the fiduciary would prepare and file a preliminary notice form and an estate tax return.
Id. §§ 6018, 6036. See also Treas. Reg. §§ 20.6018-2, 20.6036-1 (1958). If the foreign
fiduciary disagreed with the propriety of an assessment, it would proceed along the
normal routes to contest any proposed deficiency in tax. If necessary, income tax
returns and gift tax returns would also be filed on behalf of the decedent. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1-1(b) (1956). INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6012(b) (1) imposes a duty on the repre-
sentative of a decedent to make and file income tax returns required for the decedent.
Section 6903(a) of the Code invests the fiduciary with all of the decedent's rights and
obligations upon the filing of a Notice of Fiduciary Relationship (Form 506). Treas.
Reg. § 25.6010-1(b) (1958) requires a decedent's representative to file a gift tax return
for him if a return is due and the decedent dies prior to its being filed. The amount of
gift tax due, if any, may be open to question due to problems of valuation and informa-
tion gathering. The gift tax is imposed upon transfers by citizens irrespective of the
situs of the property transferred. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2501, 2511. See MacDonald,
Ex'rs v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 598 (D. Mass. 1956).
If, however, the foreign fiduciary decides not to file returns and the 010 has become
aware of the decedent's death and wishes to pursue actively the collection of the taxes
due, the tax liability will be determined and assessed and the 010 will then attempt
collection. As a first step in the assessment-collection process, 010 might simply write
to the fiduciary evidencing its awareness of the situation, inform the fiduciary of its
obligations to file a preliminary notice form, and offer to assist in this regard. If a satis-
factory response is not received, the Director of 010 is authorized to investigate the
matter himself and to summon any person having relevant information, books, papers,
or other data concerning the liability of anyone who has failed to make a return. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 7602. Furthermore, the Director is authorized to make up tax
returns for the estate from the Director's own knowledge and from such information as
he could obtain from testmiony or otherwise. His return is prima facie "good and
sufficient for all legal purposes" and has effect whether or not he can gain personal
jurisdiction over the foreign fiduciary. Id. § 6020(b).
19681 1055
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The fiduciary cannot be sure that the foreign court in charge of administering
the decedent's estate would find that the United States has the power to
impose taxes on the decedent and the fiduciary an obligation to pay, If the
fiduciary does not attempt to gain a judgment in the foreign court, by paying
the tax it runs the risk of having the beneficiaries of the estate subsequently
attack its payment. In such an event, the fiduciary may be forced to attempt
to convince the Service that it is entitled to a refund and may find itself
litigating that question in the courts of the United States. 21 Even if the fidu-
ciary is wise enough to seek a determination of its rights and duties abroad,
it is by no means clear that it will be able to obtain one. The foreign court
may refuse to determine the right of the United States under foreign law to
impose a tax on the decedent. The foreign court may feel that in absence of
an actual suit against the fiduciary, a justiciable controversy has not yet arisen.
Or, the foreign court could refuse to render an opinion on the ground that
by deciding that the United States Congress acted properly in imposing taxes
against the decedent, the court would be aiding the United States in enforcing
its tax judgments abroad.22
Other problems may also exist. Estate tax may have been assessed on
the theory that the decedent was a citizen at his death. Even if the fiduciary
is able to satisfy itself that the foreign court would hold that citizenship is
a proper basis for United States taxation and that a tax levied on that basis
should be paid, the fiduciary must somehow assure himself that the decedent
actually was an American citizen at his death.28 010 may wrongfully claim
Provisions extending the statutes of limitation aid the Service in collection from
nonresident delinquent taxpayers. In general, an amount of income, gift, or estate tax
must be assessed against a taxpayer, if at all, within three years after the date of filing
of the particular return. Id. § 6501(a). In the case of a transferee, the period of limita-
tions will not expire until one year after the expiration of the time within which assess-
ment must be made against the transferor, and, in some instances, the Code provides for
further extension of that period. Id. § 6901(c), (d)-(f). If collection of tax is hindered
or delayed because property of a taxpayer is situated or held outside the United States
or is removed from the United States, the period of limitations will not run against 010
and the fiduciary and the estate will remain indefinitely liable. Id. § 6503 (c).
The statute of limitations for commencement of criminal proceedings is either three
years or six years, depending on the offense, but the running of the statute is tolled
while the person alleged to have committed the offense is outside the United States or
is a fugitive from justice. Id. § 6531. See generally Carrigan, Tax Crimes-Stalute of
Limitations-Tolling Provisos, 11 TAx L. REv. 137 (1956).
21. A similar possibility arose in the Omar case, discussed in pt. III, section A of
this article infra. When it was suggested that after satisfying a judgment in the United
States, Citibank might find itself liable abroad and therefore have to seek recoupment in
the United States, the Service stated on oral argument that it would oppose such a claim.
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 402 (1965).
22. In attempting to enforce a United States tax judgment in Canada, on appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada, the Service attempted to argue that the action was not
one to enforce its revenue laws but rather only a suit on the judgment, which created
a new cause of action based on the promise to pay a compromised claim. United States
v. Harden, 41 D.L.R.2d 721 (Can. 1963). The court would not accept the distinction and
suggested that it would always look behind a judgment to the nature of the cause of
action in order to avoid enforcing foreign revenue claims, directly or indirectly. Id. at
726.
23. See note 3 supra.
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that a particular asset within the United States belonged to the estate, or there
may be a dispute as to whether particular property constitutes estate property.
It is not certain that the fiduciary may appear specially in the courts of the
United States to obtain a determination on these matters.2 4
The fiduciary may also be uncertain as to the extent of its obligation to
cooperate with the United States Government. If the foreign court has not
declared that the fiduciary is under a duty to satisfy taxes imposed by the
United States, the fiduciary may feel justified in refusing to inform the 010
of any underestimation of the value of the estate,25 or transfers made by the
decedent which are subject to the gift tax, or assets within the United States
over which 010 could assert quasi in rem jurisdiction. It may feel an obli-
gation to the beneficiaries of the estate to withhold this information and
attempt to retrieve assets which 010 might reach.
Practically, any attempt by a foreign fiduciary to come to this country,
or to employ agents in this country, to remove estate assets from the United
States in order to put them outside of O10's jurisdiction would meet active
resistance from the Service.26 Tactics which might be employed by the Service
are illustrated in United States v. Robbins. 27 There, the Government's tax
claims were based upon jeopardy assessments made by the Commissioner.
Service could not be made against Robbins and his wife since they were re-
siding in Mexico.28 Upon their return, Robbins and his wife were placed
under immediate surveillance. The Service then filed an application for a writ
of te exeat republica claiming that Robbins was in the process of liquidating
all of his assets in the United States and transferring them to Mexico. The
writ, issued ex parte pursuant to section 7402(a) of the Code, 29 is in the
24. The division of authority on this point is noted in the Oinar case, United States
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 391.
25. See note 20 supra.
26. See note 14 supra. Once the Service learns that a nohresident decedent owned
stocks or bonds in any corporation organized or created in the United States, the Service
may require the corporation or its transfer agent to file a return disclosing pertinent
information about the securities registered in the decedent's name. Treas. Reg. § 20.6001-
l(d) (1958). The Regulations make provision for insuring the payment of taxes due
prior to the transfer of such securities by requiring a special transfer certificate for
securities owned by a nonresident where a fiduciary has not qualified within the United
States. A domestic corporation or its transfer agent will not transfer stock registered in
the name of a nonresident decedent without first obtaining this certificate and receiving
evidence that the transfer may be made without liability. Banks and trust companies, and
all those in actual or constructive possession of the property of nonresidents, must also
obtain transfer certificates before transferring such property. Treas. Reg. § 20.6325-1(a)(1958). Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-160, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 464. No certificate is necessary if the
total gross estate situated in this country as of the day of death is less than $2,000. A
statement in good faith from the executor or other person in possession of the facts in-
dicating that the total value of property was under $2,000 is sufficient to relieve the
transferor of such property from liability. No transfer certificate is required for any
bonds owned by an alien nonresident decedent if on the day of death the bonds were not
physically in this country.
27. 235 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Ark. 1964).
28. See notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text.
29. ITT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 7402(a) provides as follows:
JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS. (a) To Issue Orders, Processes
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nature of an order requiring equitable bail. Under the writ, Robbins would
be required to post bail of $200,000 or be committed to jail. The court found
that the use of the writ would be justified where there was (1) a threatened
departure of the defendant from the jurisdiction; and (2) a danger that the
court would lose power to give effective relief due to its loss of control over
the defendant.3 0 But the court did not find that the taxpayer intended to leave
the jurisdiction of the United States or that his departure would substantially
prejudice the collection of taxes. It therefore vacated the writ and released
Robbins on his personal recognizance. Nonetheless, the case underscores the
difficulty a fiduciary would have in attempting to remove estate assets from
the United States once 010 became aware of them and knew that taxes were
due. The assets are vital to 010-unless they remain in the United States
and are adequate to satisfy the taxes due, 0I0 may have to face the problems
of collecting from a foreign asset estate.
III. TAX COLLECTION FROM A FOREIGN ASSET, FOREIGN
FiDuciARY ESTATE
In determining its ability to collect taxes from a foreign asset, foreign
fiduciary estate, 010 may assume congressional power to impose the taxes
due.31 Nonetheless, two important questions remain: (1) does Congress have
the power to decree that tax collection procedures shall have extraterritorial
effect; and if it does, (2) when, if ever, did Congress intend that tax collec-
tion procedures apply extraterritorially and that United States courts take
jurisdiction over nonresident executors? In two recent cases the Service suc-
cessfully established such international tax collection powers.
A. The Omar and the Montreal Trust Company Cases
In late 1962, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York decided the Omar case.a2 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
had assessed over 19 million dollars in taxes, interest and penalties against
and Judgments.-The district courts of the United States at the instance of the
United States shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil actions,
writs and orders of injunction, and of ne exeat republica, orders appointing re-
ceivers, and such other orders and processes, and to render such judgments, and
other decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the
internal revenue laws. The remedies hereby provided are in addition to and not
exclusive of any and all other remedies of the United States in such courts or
otherwise to enforce such laws.
30. 235 F. Supp. 353, 356 (E.D. Ark. 1964).
31. Textwriters on international law and international taxation assert that a sover-
eign's right to impose tax is virtually unlimited. See Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and In-
ternational Income, 17 TAx L. Rzv. 431 (1962) ; Wurzel, Foreign Investnent and
Extraterritorial Taxation, 38 COLuM. L. REV. 809, 815, 817, 826 (1938). See text accon-
panying note 93 infra.
32. United States v. Omar, S.A., 210 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd sub norn.
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd en bane, 325
F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
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Omar, S.A., an Uruguayan corporation. Omar did not maintain an office in
the United States and simply traded securities through accounts with several
New York brokerage houses. It had realized substantial income through the
purchase and sale of securities in the United States, on which a tax was
allegedly due. When 010 suggested the possibility that Omar was liable for
a substantial amount of tax, officers of Omar began to remove its assets from
the United States and in large part succeeded in liquidating its securities and
transferring funds out of the country. First National City Bank (Citibank),
also named as a defendant in the suit, had held assets of Omar in its main
office in New York which were transferred to its branch office in Montevideo,
Uruguay. Personal jurisdiction was acquired over Citibank but was never
obtained over Omar.
In its complaint, the Service sought a finding that Omar was indebted
to the government for unpaid taxes; that a valid lien existed in favor of the
Service on all property or rights belonging to Omar; that all defendants be
enjoined from transferring or disposing of Omar's property; that the District
Court order the return of all Omar's property to the jurisdiction of the Court;
and that the Court otder the foreclosure of the Service's lien and the sale of
any of Omar's property held by the defendants.33 The Service proceeded
under section 7402 of the Code, which grants the district courts of the United
States jurisdiction to issue at the request of the United States "decrees as
may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue
laws." '3
4
Citibank did not oppose the application of the injunction within the
United States but argued that it should not be applicable to its foreign
branches since the court had no power over property held there. The District
Court recognized that it might not have effective power over persons outside
its jurisdiction, but it accepted the Service's argument that personal juris-
diction over Citibank in New York gave the court power to compel perfor-
mance of acts within or without the United States.35 It issued a temporary
33. 321 F.2d at 17 (summary of the Service's complaint by the appeal court).
34. See note 29 supra.
35. The court cited United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2nd Cir. 1962), and First
Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
210 F. Supp. at 775. In the First National City Bank case the power of a district court
to require the production of records held in branch banks pursuant to a summons served
upon its home office was sustained. See notes 110-11 infra.
The motion for preliminary injunction was directed against Lazard Freres & Co.,
Lehman Brothers, Belgian-American Banking Corp., Belgian-American Bank & Trust
Co., First National City Bank of New York and First National City Trust Co. The last
four of these defendants submitted affidavits that they no longer held any property or
rights to property of the defendant. The court found that with the apparent exception of
the First National City Trust Co. and Belgian-American Bank & Trust Co., (1) all of
the defendants had some connection with the transfer of defendant's property outside thejurisdiction of the United States and (2) there was no showing that their foreign
branches or agents did not still hold any of defendant's assets. 210 F. Supp. at 775. Under
this state of facts the court found "sufficient reason" to enjoin all of the defendants except
First National City Trust Co. and Belgian-American Bank & Trust Co.
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injunction prohibiting Citibank from transferring any of Omar's assets in-
cluding the monies which had been on deposit at Citibank and which had
been transferred to Citibank's branch in Montevideo, Uruguay. The court
indicated that it would modify the decree should it be shown that the order
violated foreign law.36
The appeal to the Second Circuit 7 was decided in June of 1963. Citibank
argued that under New York law, a deposit in its branch bank would not be
collectible by Omar in New York, Omar's sole right being against the branch
bank in which deposits were made. That being the case, Citibank argued that
there was no debt due in the United States, and thus there was no property to
which a federal lien could attach. Implicit in the Citibank argument was the
assertion that the tax lien statute38 did not have extraterritorial effect. At
the time, the Service saw no way in which it could gain personal jurisdiction
over Omar since it was outside of the country. It asserted (1) that its lien
could attach in New York, (2) that its lien attached even if the situs of the
debt was outside-of the United States, and that (3) in any event, the district
court's having personal jurisdiction over the officers of Citibank located in
New York gave it the power to issue its injunction.39
On the Service's first assertion, Judge Moore, writing for the majority,
recognized that where personal jurisdiction over a delinquent taxpayer is
unobtainable, the Service can proceed in a quasi in rem action to enforce its
tax lien on specific property belonging to the taxpayer so long as that prop-
erty is within the jurisdiction of the court. Absent personal jurisdiction over
Omar, the action could only proceed if Citibank's debt to Omar were within
the jurisdiction of the district court. After reviewing the New York cases,
Jiidge Moore determined that accounts in foreign branch banks are not sub-
ject to attachment or execution by the process of a New York court served
in New York on the main office of the bank.40
The Service's third assertion had been accepted by the District Court
on the basis of cases sustaining its power to require the production of records
in branch banks pursuant to a summons served upon the home office. 41 Judge
36. 210 F. Supp. at 775.
37. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1965), noted in64 CoLum. L. REv. 774 (1964), 62 MicH. L. Rxv. 1084 (1964), 42 TEXAs L. REv. 731(1964) and 9 VILLANOVA L. REv. 339 (1964).
38. INT. Rm,. CoDE of 1954, § 6321.
39. 321 F.2d at 17.
40. Id. at 24.
41. See text accompanying note 35 supra. That a party whose person and property
are completely outside the jurisdiction of the court is free from its direct power is clearly
accepted. A more open question would be the propriety of coercing such a party indirectly
by using the court's equity powers against his property located outside of the jurisdiction
of the court. Dissenting in the Oinar case, Mr. justice Harlan said:
We should first consider the question in its starkest form. Assuming that there
is no quasi in, ren jurisdiction over the property ... and no reasonable likeli-
hood of obtaining personal jurisdiction over Omar, why should the court not
use its naked power, to the extent that it could be brought to bear on others
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Moore cited the absence of personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer in this
case as a crucial factor in distinguishing the cases relied on by the District
Court. He said: "Absent jurisdiction over the person of Omar, this action
can proceed only on the ground that Citibank's debt to Omar is within the
jurisdiction of the district court."4'
judge Moore therefore had to consider the Service's second assertion-
that the tax lien statute had global effect. Only if the lien were valid could
Citibank be personally liable for wrongfully refusing to surrender the prop-
erty. In finding that the tax lien statute does not have global effect, Judge
Moore stated:
If taken literally, the statute might be susceptible to this interpreta-
tion, but to so construe it would do violence to the settled principle
of statutory construction that legislation is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a con-
trary intention appears.... The Supreme Court has made manifest its
reluctance to read an extraterritorial force into statutes when to do so
would extend coverage beyond places over which the United States
has legislative control ... or would interfere with the rights of other
nations....
Absent an explicit indication to the contrary, there should not be
attributed to Congress an intent to give the courts of this nation, in
this highly sensitive area of intergovernmental relations, the power
to affect rights to property wherever located in the world. The
apparent necessity of tax treaties underscores the conclusion that
Congress has seen fit to handle this problem in another manner.
43
Judge Hays dissented and pointed out that the order of the district court
did not purport to establish or enforce any lien; it was a simple order to
Citibank in New York, over which the court had personal jurisdiction, to
keep the property of the taxpayer which it held. Judge Hays did not clarify
how the Service would be able to recover the monies on deposit in Citibank's
foreign branch if the injunction were upheld. He inquired:
situated as was Citibank, to tie up Omar's property all over the world for the
avowed purpose of coercing Omar into paying its taxes?
Use of judicial equity powers to coerce a party over whom the court has nojurisdiction or likelihood of obtaining jurisdiction is unheard of. The statute
[IRC § 7402(a)] authorizing courts to render such decrees as may be "neces-
sary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws" clearly
intends that courts use only their traditional equity powers to that end. It should
not be interpreted as an authorization to employ radically new and extremely
far-reaching forms of coercive action in a more free-wheeling approach to inter-
national than to domestic cases. Neither the Government nor the Court argues
for such an extraordinary judicial use of power. Suffice it to say that if the con-
trary position were taken, serious constitutional problems would arise.
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 389 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
42. 321 F.2d at 19, citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1950). In Hanson, the
Supreme Court found that the State of Florida could not exercise jurisdiction over a
fiduciary located in Delaware since, although the settlor was domiciled in Florida, the
fiduciary had insufficient contracts with the state to support jurisdiction.
43. 321 F.2d at 23, 24.
1061
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW[
Even if it should be granted that in the present proceeding the gov-
ernment could not recover property of the taxpayer held by a foreign
branch, is this court now prepared to hold, for example, that there
is no possibility that a receiver appointed under the authority of
§ 7402(a) would be able to proceed against taxpayer's property
under any circumstances or anywhere other than New York ?44
The dissent did not consider the impact of the amendments to Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which were ordered by the Supreme
Court45 in January of 1963, to become effective on July 1, although these
amendments would prove to be vital in upholding its view of the Omar case
in the Supreme Court.46
As originally drawn, Rule 4(e) created doubt as to whether, in absence
of a federal statute, service could be made upon a nonresident under state
statutes and rules, such as nonresident motor vehicle laws and other state
long-arm statutes, which predicate in personam jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent upon the doing of an act in or maintaining some other valid contact with
the state.47 As amended in 1963, Rule 4(e) now provides in its relevant parts:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court there-
under provides for service of a summons * * * upon a party not an
inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is
held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no provi-
sion therein prescribing the manner of service in a manner stated
in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which
the district court is held provides * * * for service of a summons
* * * upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state,
* * service may * * * be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed in the statute or rule.48
The italicized second sentence of the statute was added in 1963. The
change in the rules appears to have been made in order to permit the federal
courts to make use of state long-arm statutes and thereby maintain federal
court service of process on a par with the courts of the state.
In October of 1963, the Omar case was reargued before the Court of
Appeals sitting en banc,49 and Judge Moore's decision was affirmed. The
44. 321 F.2d at 26.
45. See 374 U.S. 865 (1963). 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964) gives the Supreme Court the
power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for federal district courts and provides:
"All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect."
46. See text accompanying note 64 infra.
47. 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 4.32 (1967); Kaplan, Amendments of The
Federal Rides of Cizil Procedure, 1961-1963 77 HARV. L. REv. 601, 619-22 (1964).
48. Rule 4(f) was also amended to conform to Rule 4(e). It now provides in relevant
part:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held, and when authorized by a
statute of the United States or by these rules beyond the territorial limits of that
state.
49. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 325 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1963), noted in
16 STAN. L. Rv. 1101 (1964).
1062 [Vol. 68:1049
TAXING NONRESIDENT ESTATES
Service at that time put forth an entirely new contention. Previously, the
Service had admitted its inability to gain personal jurisdiction over delinquent
taxpayers residing abroad. It now argued:
It is only in the event that the Court concludes that the lien does not
attach to such deposits that personal jurisdiction over Omar becomes
relevant. In such event the Government should be afforded an oppor-
tunity to obtain personal jurisdiction over Omar and the injunction
should stand pending such efforts.50
The Service seemed to see a possibility of gaining personal service over Omar
by making use of section 302 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,
a long-arm statute, which had become effective September 1, 1963.51 Any
doubt of this was dispelled by the Montreal Trust Company case,5 2 decided
by the Southern District of New York in May of 1964.
In Montreal Trust the Service sought the payment of income taxes said
to be due from a nonresident alien decedent, the Montreal Trust Company
being an executor of the estate. 53 The Service alleged that Isidore Klein, a
Canadian resident and domiciliary, had used his corporate position as man-
aging director of a Canadian distillery to force distributing agents in the
United States to pay commissions to his American friends and relatives. The
Service argued that under the attribution rules the commissions paid repre-
sented taxable income to Klein.
Since the foreign executor bank did no business in New York, originally
the Service attempted to serve a summons on the New York correspondent
of the executor. This failed when the district court granted the executor's
motion to set that service aside. The Service then had the United States Vice-
Consul personally serve a summons on the bank in Canada pursuant to the
New York long-arm statute5 which provides, in its relevant part:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary,
or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from
any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if
he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent
he:
1. transacts any business within the state ....
There were no estate assets in New York and neither the executor nor
the decedent ever personally transacted business in New York. Yet the Ser-
vice successfully asserted an agency relationship between the decedent and
the local distributors whose acts of negotiating and signing a contract on be-
half of the decedent and distributing income in New York at the decedent's
50. 379 U.S. at 393.
51. N.Y. CPLR § 302 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1967).
52. 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
53. A co-executrix was also served but did not appear in the action.
54. N.Y. CPLR § 302 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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request were found sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the New York
statute.
Counsel for the executor had argued that personal jurisdiction over the
foreign estate could not be acquired by service under the long-arm statute for
two reasons. First, the New York statute was not applicable to an action
brought in a federal court. Second, it would be unconstitutional to apply the
statute so as to validate service beyond the boundaries of the United States.5
The district court found that the amendments to Rule 4 "plainly mean
that a party not an inhabitant or found within the state may be served with
summons in a federal court action under the circumstances and in the manner
prescribed by state statute." 56 It then concluded that since the New York
statute did not specifically prohibit service of process on an executor located
outside of the country, the Service could effect service under the authority
of the statute.67 The court's approval of this application of the state long-arm
statute was not modified when the case was reviewed again in October of
1964.58 Before an appeal from the decision could be taken to the Second Cir-
cuit, certiorari had been granted by the Supreme Court on the Omar case,50
which was decided early in 1965.
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the Supreme Court's opinion in Omar.
On a rationale similar to Judge Hays' in the court below,60 the Court upheld
the validity of the injunction against Citibank, reversing Judge Moore's de-
cision in the court of appeals"' and upholding the decision of the district
court.
6 2
Justice Douglas considered the narrow issue of whether the creditor
(the United States) could by injunction pendente lite protect whatever rights
the debtor (Omar) had against Citibank, which was before the court on per-
sonal service. In so defining the issue Justice Douglas explained that if it
were clear that the debtor could not be brought within the reach of the district
court by personal service, "we would have quite a different case-one on
which we intimate no opinion."' 63 But the New York long-arm statute and
the 1963 amendments to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made
such service possible. Justice Douglas noted that the amended rules "allow a
party not an inhabitant of the State or found therein to be served with a sum-
mons in a federal court in the manner and under the circumstances prescribed
55. 35 F.R.D. at 218.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 219.
58. 235 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
59. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965), notcd in 51
A.B.AJ. 376 (1965), 2 TEXAS INT'L L. FORUM 119 (1965) and 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 13(1965).
60. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
61. See notes 37 to 43 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 32 to 36 supra and accompanying text.
63.-379 U.S. at 381.
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by a state statute,"' ' and cited the lower court opinion in Montreal Trust 5
with approval. He reasoned that if personal jurisdiction over Omar is ever
acquired, the United States will be able to collect from Citibank what the
bank owed Omar. Therefore, "[t]he opportunity to make that collection
should not be lost in limine."' 66 There was no indication that foreign law
would be violated by freezing the Montevideo accounts pending service on
Omar. If there were, the district court had retained jurisdiction to modify
the order and the district court was open to the Excecutive Branch should the
litigation embarrass United States' diplomacy.
6 7
Mr. Justice Harlan, who was joined by Mr. Justice Goldberg in dissent,
argued that although the district court had the naked power to issue the in-
junction,0 8 its order was not "'appropriate for the enforcement of the internal
revenue laws'" and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction within the mean-
ing of section 7402(a).69 In the dissenters' view, the fact that Citibank's
officers had sufficient control over the Montevideo branch bank to require
compliance with the injunction and could be held in contempt if they failed
to was not sufficient reason to uphold the injunction order. Rather they main-
tained that the Service was obligated to show that at the time the injunction
issued in October of 1962, the fund which was to be frozen might be subject
to ultimate execution. 70 Because New York's long-arm statute did not be-
come effective until September 1, 1963,71 ten months after the injunction,
and because there was no other substantial theory72 under which the Service
could have hoped to gain personal jurisdiction over Omar, the injunction
should have been dismissed. Even considering the injunction "as of now,"
the position of the dissenters was that the Service must show, as a matter of
both state and federal law, that it was equitable to continue the injunction;
and this they found had not been done.73
64. Id.
65. 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
66. 379 U.S. at 383.
67. Id. at 384-85.
68. Id. at 387.
69, Id. at 410.
70. Id. at 390.
71. Citibank argued that at the time the injunction was issued it could not be served
under the provisions of section 302 since the complaint was filed, and the injunction was
issued before the New York statute became effective. The Court's response was that the
New York Court of Appeals had indicated that where, as in the Qmar case, a suit based
on a prior transaction was pending on the effective date of the statute, the statute would
apply to all further proceedings, except where it would "work injustice." Id. at 382.
72. The dissenters considered the Service's argument that Omar might voluntarily
make a general appearance to defend the suit a "lame suggestion." Id. at 390 n.8.
73. Id. at 391-96. During the course of the argument, counsel for Citibank contended
that its foreign banking business would be hurt because foreign depositors would be dis-
couraged from using United States banks for fear that their funds could be reached by
American courts. The Court saw no sure way to gauge the seriousness of this proba-
bility. In the course of preparing this article inquiry was made of counsel for several
leading New York banks in order to determine the effect that the Citibank decision had
on their foreign branch business. In each case, replies indicated that business had not
suffered, the general impression being that customers were either unaware of the import
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The dissenters considered that the Service's achievement in the case was
to place the Government in a position to "snare only those taxpayers smart
and unscrupulous enough to withdraw their funds from the United States,
but stupid and uninformed enough, even after this decision, to put the trans-
ferred funds in a bank having a United States office." 74 Their feelings as to
the impact of the case were summarized when they stated that "[fin order
to provide the Government with this toy pistol the Court flexes its muscles
in a manner never before imagined." 75
When the Montreal Trust case was argued before the Second Circuit in
November of 1965,76 the Service's use of the New York long-arm statute to
gain jurisdiction over the foreign executor was unquestioned. It was noted
that the Supreme Court had in Omar cited with approval the lower court de-
cision in Montreal Trust on this point.77 The petition for certiorari to the
of the decision or unconcerned because of their willingness to satisfy their tax liabilities.
Although fear of loss of business has subsided, counsel for one New York City bank with
foreign branches did indicate a general dissatisfaction with the Oinar decision in banking
circles. He was confident that had banking business been clearly affected, Congress
would have considered legislation to overturn the decision since its interest in encourag-
ing foreign investment in overseas branches of American banks far outweighs the possi-
bilities of trapping an isolated tax dodger.
On an actual rather than a predicted result of allowing the injunction to stand,justice Harlan observed that:
As far as Omar is concerned, its property has been taken from its control by a
court having jurisdiction neither over the corporation nor over the property...
prior to any judgment of liability being entered against it, and during a time
when the Uruguayan peso has fallen over 60%.
Id. at 392.
74. 379 U.S. at 401. The dissenters were no more satisfied with the Service's han-
dling of the case than they were with the decision reached by the majority of the Court.
In reviewing the Service's tactics, Mr. Justice Harlan observed:
The Government's delay in obtaining personal jurisdiction is particularly sig-
nificant because of the unknowns and imponderables with which the case in its
present posture is saturated. Thus, we have no firm indication of what Uru-
guayan law is with respect to any aspect of this action, no indication of the effect
freeze orders would have on this country's banking interests, and Omar, the
foreign taxpayer whose interests are most at stake, is not before the Court. Can
it be doubted that a decision upon the propriety of the novel use of judicial
power here involved could be much better made if the issue were presented in
a context with some of the unknowns removed? Had the Government not de-
layed but, instead, proceeded (if possible) to acquire personal jurisdiction over
Omar, and then judgment and execution (if possible) against the Montevideo
account, the case could come before us with most of this opaqueness removed.
Id. at 394 n.13.
The Service attempted to excuse its failure to attempt to gain personal jurisdiction
over Omar by claiming that during the pendency of the action it had altered the theory
under which it chose to argue its case, 379 U.S. at 392, 393. This, of course, was due to
the decision in the Montreal Trust Company case. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
75. 379 U.S. at 401. In order to make a decision in its favor more palatable, the
Service, by its own action, sharply limited the application of the holding in the Onar
case. During the pendency of the action, it amended its regulation (Treas. Reg. § 301.-
6332-1 (1954), as amended, T.D. 6746, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 497) declaring that it would
limit its use of temporary injunction orders freezing funds in foreign branches of United
States banks so as to reach only funds which were transferred out of this country in order
to hinder or delay the collection of taxes. 379 U.S. at 400.
76. 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966), noted in 42 NOTE DAmI LAwYER 273 (1966), 15
U. KAN. L. Rzv. 574 (1967) and 20 VAND. L. IRv. 213 (1966).
77. 358 F.2d at 245. The court also cited Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d
546, 549 (4th Cir. 1965), which noted the district court decision in the Montreal Trust
Company case with approval. The idea that Rule 4(e) specifically permits extraterri-
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Supreme Court to review the affirmance of the district court's opinion in
favor of the Service was denied.78 Subsequently, both the Montreal Trust
case and the Omar case were settled without further proceedings.
B. The Omar and Montreal Trust Company Cases in Perspective
The Supreme Court has not of course placed its full stamp of approval
on the unbridled use of state long-arm statutes for tax litigation in the federal
courts. In fact, it is possible to agree with the conclusions reached by the
district court in Montreal Trust concerning the general effect of amended
Rule 4 without reaching its specific conclusion that the Service may serve
foreign executors under the authority of the long-arm statute in an action for
unpaid federal taxes so long as the decedent "transacted business in the state."
To bolster its finding upholding service on the foreign executor, the district
court in Montreal Trust cited the Advisory Committee79 Notes to Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which indicated that the amended rules
were intended to have the effect of allowing the federal courts to make use
of the new state "long-arm" statutes.8 0
It is quite possible, however, that the draftsmen of the amended rules
never intended to allow the use of a state long-arm statute in cases involving
federal questions for which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.8'
It would be plausible to read the amended rules as merely putting the federal
courts on a par with state courts in allowing the use of state long-arm statutes
in those -actions-and only in those actions-which could be brought in the
courts of the state.
But perhaps the most likely reading of the rules would find a grant of
authority to use extraterritorial service in all cases in which such service is
available in state courts, and also in cases involving exclusive federal juris-
diction, if Congress has affirmatively indicated that it desires extraterritorial
service of process. Under the first sentence of Rule 4(e),82 before extraterri-
torial service can be made on the basis of a federal statute, there must be some
indication of an intention on the part of Congress to provide for service of a
torial service under state law even on federal claims was advanced with citation to the
district court decision in the Montreal Trust Company case and the Supreme Court de-
cision in the Omar case. In Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp.
70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the district court allowed service of process under procedures es-
tablished by the New York long-arm statute in order to enable plaintiff to enforce a
claim against a foreign corporation which arose under the anti-trust laws. The federal
statute involved (15 U.S.C. § 22 (1964)) specifically provided that suit could be brought
against the corporation "'in any district wherein it ... transacts business."' 244 F. Supp.
at 75.
78. 384 U.S. 919 (1966).
79. The rules which the Supreme Court promulgates are prepared by Committees
of the Judicial Conference designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Order
to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 865 (1963).
80. See the Advisory Committee Notes to the Rule in 3A W. BARRON & A. HOLT-
ZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 210-11 (C. Wright ed. Supp. 1967).
81. But see note 77 supra.
82. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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summons upon a nonresident.8 3 Similarly, where the federal court's juris-
diction is exclusive, the second sentence of Rule 4(e) 84 could be interpreted
as limiting service under a state long-arm statute to situations where a Con-
gress has affirmatively indicated an intention to provide for service of a
summons upon a nonresident.
At the very least, it seems unreasonable to suggest that a state long-arm
statute may be used when a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction and Con-
gress has in some way evidenced its intention that extraterritorial service of
process not be allowed. If the intention of Congress were thought irrelevant,
and a state long-arm statute applied in any federal question suit, Congress
would have to act affirmatively if it wished to prevent federal courts from
affecting extraterritorial service upon defendants in any case where for
counter-balancing reasons, such as its concern for the international situation,
Congress did not wish to allow such service to be made. Our traditional ad-
herence to the "territorial principal" of jurisdiction and our courts' respect
for the will of Congress on jurisdictional matters"; would place such a wide
reading of amended Rule 4 in grave doubt.
If the amended rules are read so as to permit extraterritorial service of
process, such a finding would not fail for want of congressional power to
provide for extraterritorial service of process in tax collection matters. This
being a purely federal matter, the question would be whether extraterritorial
service would contravene the due process provisions of the fifth amendment.
Admittedly, the problem goes beyond the settled issue of the constitutionality
of the state long-arm statutes.8 6 But Congress' power to subject citizens to
83. Cf. SEC v. VTR, Inc., 39 F.R.D. 19, 21 (1966) (service of process abroad by
Securities and Exchange Commission on foreign bank under provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure upheld after provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 were in-
terpreted as authorizing service of process abroad).
84. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
86. On the appeal of the Montreal Trust Company case to the Second Circuit, Judge
Kaufman observed:
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1887), the area in which
states are constitutionally permitted to assert their jurisdiction has undergone
great expansion. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, [326 U.S. 310
(1945)], and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), are
among the landmarks pointing the way in this direction. And New York, like
many other states, enacting its "long-arm" statute with the intention of taking
advantage of the "new enclave" opened by these cases. New York Advisory
Comm. Rep. (N.Y. Legis. Doc., 1958, No. 13), 39-40: 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller,
New York Civil Practice § 302.06.
There is no serious challenge on this appeal to the constitutional power of
New York to enact § 302. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, supra,
authorizes a state to assert its jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries with whom it
has sufficient minimum contacts, "such that the maintenance of suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'." 326 U.S. at 316,
To meet this requirement, New York in enacting § 302 has not sought to obtain
full in personam jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business within
its boundaries. Rather, New York has limited itself to jurisdiction only in those
"causes of action" arising out of activity conducted within the state. Since such a
limitation of jurisdiction complies with the mandate of International Shoe Co.,
supra, we are not here presented with a constitutional issue but with a narrow
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extraterritorial service of process has already been clearly decided, 8 7 and
under the long-arm statute, service upon a nonresident alien is acceptable if
grounded on the "transaction of business" within the state.88 To date, the
courts have not found that Congress has misused its right to levy tax or to
provide for the collection of tax internationally. Indeed, in exercising its in-
ternational taxing authority, Congress has been considered much too timid.8 9
It has been held that jurisdiction may be obtained over the fiduciary on the
basis of the acts of the decedent.9 0 The fiduciary is called upon only in his
capacity as an executor or administrator to answer for the acts of the decedent
rather than for any act of his own, and if a foreign court does not relieve him
of the obligation to answer service of process,91 due process would seem to be
satisfied if provision were made for adequate notice and an opportunity to
be heard.
Although the constitutional adequacy of long-arm jurisdiction tends to
be measured by the same criteria for both state and federal courts9 2 a good
case can be made for the proposition that the federal courts should have
greater power than state courts to assert in personam jurisdiction over non-
resident taxpayers. There is a fundamental difference between the federal
government's power to tax and the power to tax enjoyed by the states. The
federal government has a national power to tax all persons including non-
residents and should be able to strike harder and reach further in its tax
collection than the states whose taxes are purely local in nature.93 Further-
more, a tax owed by a resident of a sister state can be collected by suit in the
sister state. In such a case a question of inconvenience is usually all that is at
issue. Federal tax judgments are not normally collectible abroad. When the
Service's ability to subject the nonresident taxpayer to suit in the United
States is determined, the collectibility of the tax may be at stake.
If Congress has the requisite power, the issue becomes whether Congress
intended to permit service of process under state long-arm statutes on foreign
question of statutory interpretation-did Klein, within the meaning of the "long-
arm" statute, transact business in New York.
358 F2d. at 242.
87. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1931) ; SEC v. Briggs, 234
F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
88. See notes 77 & 86, and text accompanying note 54, stpra. But see note 107 infra.
89. Wurzel, smpra note 31, at 819; see Norr, supra note 31.
90. In Rosenfeld v. Hotel Corp. of America, 20 N.Y.2d 25, 228 N.E.2d 374, 281
N.Y.S.2d 308 (1967), the Court of Appeals of New York upheld the constitutionality of
obtaining in personam jurisdiction over substituted nonresident executors, by out-of-state
service upon such executors, although such nonresident executors had committed no acts
and transacted no business in New York.
91. Presumably, the United States would respect a decision of the foreign court
which restrained the fiduciary from making an appearance in the courts of the United
States. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
92. See United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 257 (2d Cir. 1966) ; SEC
v. Briggs, 234 F. Supp. 618, 620 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (Timbers, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
93. Wurzel, supra note 31, at 823-24.
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fiduciaries in tax cases. The Second Circuit in Oinar noted the basic canon
of construction that federal legislation is interpreted to apply only within the
territorial limits of the United States in absence of a clear legislative intent
to the contrary9 4
It can be noted that while no federal statute specifically provides for ex-
traterritorial service of process, the Code and Regulations are written in
sweeping terms, generally applying to all persons and all things. Arguably,
if nonresidents are subject to tax, there must be effective procedural ma-
chinery available to compel them to pay.95
Yet there are indications that such a generalization is inaccurate. For
instance, the general language of section 7602, which provides the Service
with subpoena powers appears at first glance to encompass all persons every-
where, and where the person is a citizen, Congress clearly has the power to
provide for such extraterritorial subpoena service.9 However, Congress has
not made clear that it intends to provide for enforcement of a subpoena outside
the United States. Sections 7402(b) and 7604, the enforcement sections in the
Code applicable to section 7602 subpoenas, provide for enforcement against
"any person"--but only in the judicial district in which such person resides
or in the judicial district in which such person is found. Arguably, such lack
of enforcement provisions is indicative of a congressional intent to limit the
issuance of subpoenas under the Code to cases in which service can be made
within the territorial limits of the United States. Moreover, although under
certain circumstances there is statutory authorization for the service of a
subpoena abroad on a United States citizen in connection with civil or crimi-
nal proceedings pending in a United States court,97 the statute authorizing
extraterritorial service of process does not purport to authorize extraterri-
torial service of subpoenas issued by administrative agencies of the United
States Government.
Even if it is accepted that a fiduciary may be brought within the juris-
diction of the federal courts on the basis of the transactions of the decedent,
the value to the Service of such expanded jurisdiction may be questioned. If
the Service gains jurisdiction over a foreign fiduciary and demands that the
fiduciary return the decedent's property located abroad to the United States,
presumably the foreign court will prohibit the removal of the property from
the foreign country because to allow this would be to enforce indirectly the
tax laws of the United States.98
The Service might attempt to take action against the foreign fiduciary
94. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
95. Under this theory, tax treaties are entered into merely to assist in tax collection
abroad rather than as the only way in which to make such collection possible.
96. See note 87 supra.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1964).
98. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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on the theory that it is personally liable for the taxes due. 9  In such an event,
the fiduciary may argue that the long-arm statute is tied to the act of the
decedent so that it only envisions a suit against the fiduciary in its represen-
tative capacity as executor. Furthermore, if the fiduciary has not transacted
business in the United States, the minimum contacts which due process re-
quire in order to subject him to suit here on a personal basis would not
exist.100 Even if the fiduciary comes to the United States to defend a suit for
taxes against the estate, he arguably would be present only in a fiduciary
capacity and would not be subject to suit on the basis of his personal liability.
The courts have attached significance to the distinction between action
in a personal and in a corporate capacity. In Application of Daniels,10 1 a
United States citizen, the president and sole stockholder of a nonresident
Panamanian corporation, was located by the Service in the United States and
summoned to appear before a special agent to give testimony concerning his
personal tax liability. In connection with the investigation, Daniels was asked
to bring records of the corporation to the hearing. Daniels argued that if he
were compelled to produce the books of the foreign corporation which itself
was not subject to service, the Service would be able to gain by indirect means
that which it could not obtain by direct action. 10 2 He also argued that to per-
mit the Service to examine the corporation's books and records would in-
fringe principles of international law and comity and violate his rights under
the fourth and fifth amendments since he was holding the records in a purely
personal capacity and not as corporate custodian.1' 8
The District Court for the Southern District of New York agreed. Judge
Kaufman recognized the general right of the Service to compel production of
corporate and organizational documents by an official custodian who claims
the privilege of self-incrimination. Nonetheless, he drew attention to the peti-
tioner's claim that he held the corporate books in his "personal capacity" and
that his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination allowed him to
withhold the books from examination. 0
4
99. See note 18 supra.
100. But see text accompanying note 131 infra.
101. 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
102. Id. at 324.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 327-28. United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962), a later Second
Circuit case which had been heavily relied on by the district court in deciding the Omar
case, may foreshadow a narrow interpretation of the Daniels case. In Ross the Service
brought an action to subject property of the defendant to the payment of jeopardy assess-
ments for unpaid income taxes. The corporations involved were foreign based and could
not be served with the process. Ross, although a resident of Nassau, Bahamas, was a
citizen of the United States. The Service concluded that Ross had failed to report income
for prior years and obtained jeopardy assessments upon learning that Ross was trans-
ferring assets out of the country. It also obtained an order from the district court which
(1) appointed a receiver over Ross's property, (2) directed Ross to deliver his stock
(which was located in the Bahamas) in two foreign corporations to the receiver,
(3) restrained Ross from transferring any of his own property and (4) restrained Ross
from transferring property of the foreign corporations. Id. at 833.
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Similarly, an individual foreign fiduciary or an employee of a foreign
corporate fiduciary may come to this country or do his business here, either
in his personal or fiduciary capacity or both. In absence of an advance
statement by a fiduciary, it remains totally unclear as to what facts would
be necessary to prove that an individual found within the United States,
or found doing business here, was present in a "personal" capacity rather
than a "fiduciary" capacity.10 5 Thus it will be difficult for the fiduciary to
prove that he is acting in a "personal" rather than "representative" ca-
pacity, and this may sharply limit his ability to rely on the Daniels approach.
If, for instance, an employee of a corporate fiduciary were found in the United
States while in possession of the estate books and records, what persuasive
evidence would he submit to prove that he held the documents in a "personal"
capacity? The presumption would in all likelihood be to the contrary.
Even if an individual foreign fiduciary can prove that he is present in the
United States only in an individual capacity, his presence makes him subject
to suit. Similarly, a foreign corporate fiduciary "transacting business" only
for its personal account in the United States would be subject to the juris-
diction of our courts in a personal capacity under a New York State type
long-arm statute0 6 if the cause of action for the taxes due could be said to
arise from the fiduciary's transaction of business in the state. How closely the
fiduciary's activities in this country would have to be related to the adminis-
tration of a foreign asset estate in order for a court to reach this result is un-
clear. 0 7
The obvious argument for existence of a personal fiduciary liability is
that the Code specifically imposes personal liability on the fiduciary without
regard to the problems of jurisdiction or collection. 10 8 On the other hand, it
would seem reasonable for a court to refuse to apply the statute providing for
personal liability where a fiduciary could prove both that the Service cannot
reach the assets of the estate, and that under foreign law the fiduciary would
be denied reimbursement from the estate if it were held personally liable for
When Ross contended that the order to turn over stock certificates to the receiver
would deprive him of his right against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment, the
Second Circuit specifically declined to apply the Daniels case or to decide at that time
whether Ross could properly claim the fifth amendment privilege with respect to corpo-
rate books and records of the foreign corporations not doing business in the United
States. Id. at 834-35.
105. In Daniels, the court was impressed by the fact that petitioner was the president
and sole stockholder of his corporation, that the corporation did no business in the United
States and that the Service addressed its summons to the petitioner in his individual
capacity rather than as a representative of his corporation. 140 F. Supp. at 327-28.
106. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
107. In the Montreal Trust Company case, the bank argued in the district court that
the New York long-arm statute could only be used to sue on a cause of action which
arose directly from and was immediately related to business done in the state. The bank
argued that the claim for income tax was not a claim "arising from" the decedent's al-
leged acts in the jurisdiction within the meaning of the statute. The court refused to
accept such a narrow view of the statute. 35 F.R.D. at 221-22.
108. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6901.
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the estate's tax obligations. This would simply be an application of the idea
expressed in Daniels that the Service may not do indirectly what it is barred
from doing directly. Indeed, similar reasoning could be used to limit the
statute providing for transferee liability where the transferee could prove that
the assets of the estate were unreachable and that no cause of action for reim-
bursement from the estate could be maintained in the foreign court.'0 9
That the scope of Code provisions in the international area may depend
on foreign law is not heretical; the principle is well illustrated by established
rules regarding service of a subpoena on a foreign fiduciary. If the subpoena
is validly served in the United States, the fiduciary will have to comply, even
to the point of producing records kept outside of the United States." 0 But an
exception to this rule is recognized where to do so would violate the law of
the country where the fiduciary resides. In Application of Chase Manhattan
Bank,"' a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed Chase to produce rec-
ords held at its branch in the Republic of Panama. Chase agreed to produce
all relevant records in its possession in New York, but refused to produce
records from its Panama branch unless it was shown that the production of
such records did not violate Panamanian law. The bank's concern was the
possibility that it would be committing a crime under the law of Panama if
it acceded to the requests of the Service. When during the course of the hear-
ings, the government of Panama enacted a law which prohibited the repro-
duction of certain books for use in an action abroad in compliance with the
orders of foreign authorities, the court modified the Service's subpoena to
exclude the demand for such materials." 2
The real difficulty with giving the Service every opportunity to obtain
jurisdiction by which it may attempt to compel the payment of taxes by a
foreign fiduciary is that -this approach does not adequately account for the
real dilemma in which the foreign fiduciary may find himself. The Service has
109. The liability of transferees is several, and normally a transferree may be held
liable for the full amount of tax up to the value of the assets received by him. Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 603 (1931). Nonetheless, it is assumed that a transferee
who has paid more than his proportionate share of the tax has a right to contribution
against other transferees and a right of reimbursement from the estate. See Phillips-
Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 237 (1937).
110. The principle that jurisdiction once obtained brings with it the power to direct
action in foreign countries is well set forth in SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215
(9th Cir. 1945). See also In re National Pub. Util. Corp., 79 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1935);
In re Rivera, 79 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
111. 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962). Accord, First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d
616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960) (subpoena duces tecum reinstated
where there was no showing that law of Panama would be violated by compliance). See
also, Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign
Law, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1441 (1963) ; Note, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign
Jurisdiction Where Law of Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 295 (1962).
112. 297 F.2d at 613. The facts of the decision indicate that the grand jury instructed
Chase to produce the Panamanian records on January 30, 1961, and that on the same
day the President of Panama signed into law the legislation prohibiting production of
the records. Id. at 612. The transcript of the testimony of the expert witness produced by
Chase indicates that the legislation restricting removal of records from Panama had
been introduced some time before. Joint Appendix to Record at 62a.
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shown that it may not be ready to exercise the necessary self-restraint.1 1 8 If
an international tax collection case involving a foreign fiduciary of a foreign
asset estate is pressed unfairly on an administrative or a judicial level, the
decision will profoundly affect the position of our citizens abroad and the
position of this country in the international community. At best, the United
States can expect foreign countries to treat our citizens no better than we
treat foreigners. It is certainly in this country's interest to encourage foreign
fiduciaries, particularly corporate fiduciaries, to invest in the United States
and to deal with American companies abroad, as well as to continue to have
faith in our system of justice. It does not seem enough to voice the hope, as
the Supreme Court did in Omar,"4 that in the event matters get out of hand,
the executive branch will step in.
IV. THE FoRIGxN FmuciARY's DILEmMA
The reality of the foreign fiduciary's dilemma is well illustrated by a re-
view of the facts presented in an unreported decision of the Supreme Court
of Ontario." 5
Harron, a Canadian citizen and domiciliary, created an irrevocable life-
time trust naming the Toronto General Trusts Corporation (now by merger
the Canada Permanent Trust Company) as trustee. Under the terms of the
trust, income was payable to the settlor during his life, remainder as the settlor
might appoint. In default of any appointment on the settlor's death, income
was payable to his wife for life, remainder to Toronto General Hospital. Com-
mon stock of a United States corporation comprised the corpus of the trust.
Harron died in California in 1954, and his wife became the recipient of the
income of the trust until her death in 1957. OI requested the trustee to file
an estate tax return but it declined to do so. The executor of Harron's estate,
who was also contacted by 010, did file a return. In 1961, both the executor
and the trustee were assessed for payment of estate taxes due. Apparently,
113. See 297 F.2d at 612. During the proceedings against the bank, the Service
learned that it could gain access to Panamanian records of American firms by making
application directly through the Panamanian courts. Joint Appendix to Record at 55a.
But only after subjecting the bank to lengthy court proceedings did the Service (after
being denied access to the books and records through the American courts) turn to the
Panamanian courts and ultimately gain its objective. Letter from James P. Power, Ass't
Staff Counsel, The Chase Manhattan Bank, to author, Oct. 16, 1967. Considering the
presence of such an alternative way in which to proceed, it can be questioned whether the
Service should have continued to press its case against Chase after it had learned that
it could move in a foreign court. Similarly, Omar can be viewed as a case in which the
Service pressed for a temporary injunction at a time when there was no foreseeable way
for it ultimately to collect on a judgment.
114. 379 U.S. at 384-85.
115. In re Harron (Ont. Sup. Ct., June 23, 1965) (unreported decision). The facts
of the Harron case are reported on the basis of an affidavit submitted to the court by an
officer of the trust company who served as trustee. Record at 3-9. Copies of documents
referring to the Harron case are on file at the library of the University of Connecticut
School of Law.
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the theory behind OIO's assessment of the trustee was its personal liability
as a transferee.
Following the assessment, the trustee proceeded to make inquiry into
the scope of its liability. Its counsel in the United States rendered an opinion
that:
(a) the tax levied by the United States Treasury Department has
been properly assessed;
(b) in the case of a non-resident of the United States, no deduction
is allowed under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code for the value
of property passing to a charitable institution which is not a
United States organization;
(c) all parties concerned, namely the Executor, the Trustee and
the Hospital, are personally liable for the tax, and the assets
owned by each of them and located in the United States can be
levied upon for payment;
(d) criminal penalties enforceable in the United States are imposed
upon any person who wilfully fails to pay the tax and these
would apply to a person taking part in a decision not to pay.116
Canadian counsel for the trustee then learned from the 010 that it was
preparing upwards of thirty notices of levy against various banks, trust com-
panies, investment dealers and other financial institutions in New York City
who were indebted to the trustee.' 17 010 did not suggest that it would hold
off on its collection efforts until the trustee could gain instructions from the
Canadian court. Indeed, 010 clearly indicated to counsel for the trustees that
its policy was to continue all possible efforts to collect the tax by seizures,
levies and the like and that whenever possible the scope and number of such
efforts would be expanded and increased.11 8 In particular, it was stressed that
an attempt would be made to serve notices of levy against the American Ex-
press Company, various United States banks and bond paying agencies, and
other similar agencies so that the trustee would be prevented from obtaining
recovery or reimbursement in connection with United States obligations
which might become due to it in the course of its ordinary business." 9
Apparently OI made it quite clear that its intention was to tie up com-
pletely the trustee's personal affairs in the United States as soon as possible.
Indeed, in two cases where notices of levy were served, the assets or accounts
levied upon were in fact held by the trustee in trust or as agent for some other
person or corporation, and in order to satisfy the United States authorities
that this was in fact the case, the trustee found it necessary to prepare or ob-
tain and submit extensive and precise documentation of the terms of the trusts
or agencies in question.120 These procedures required many hours of time on
116. Record at 5-6. The hospital's position is -outlined in detail in its counsel's brief
to the court. Brief for Respondent, the Trustees of the Toronto General Hospital.
117. Record at 6-7.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 7-8.
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the part of the trustee and caused it expense, trouble, embarrassment and dis-
ruption in the carrying on of its personal business.121 Apparently, 010 made
no advance investigation to avoid the occurrence. Nor did 010 suggest a
plan under which the trustee would be given time to obtain an adjudication
from the Canadian court on its rights and obligations. Understandably, after
OIO's actions, the trustee was happy to cooperate with the Service.
When so informed, the Hospital-beneficiary set out to investigate the
situation. It was informed by its legal counsel that the relevant general rule
of conflict of laws is that courts will not recognize foreign revenue laws in
proceedings which in substance are an attempt to enforce indirectly a claim
to tax by the revenue authorities of another state.1 22 Counsel took the position
that difficulties encountered by the trustee in the United States as a result
of the Service's efforts at collection did not involve the administration of the
trust, and that since the Hospital could not benefit from the payment of the
taxes due, the use of the trust fund for the payment of such taxes would be in
breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty.1 23 Accordingly, the Hospital refused to
authorize the trustee to indemnify itself out of the trust assets for any United
States tax which the trustee might pay and would not recognize any right in
the trustee to do so. 1 24
The trustee then requested direction from the Supreme Court of Ontario
on the following questions:
1. Is the Trustee entitled to be indemnified out of the trust property
for any monies which it may pay in respect of the claim of the
Internal Revenue Service of the United States Treasury Depart-
ment for United States federal estate taxes, penalties and interest
assessed and outstanding against the Trustee?
2. Has the Trustee any right or obligation to assert a claim over
against the executor of the will and trustee of the estate of the
deceased Settlor for reimbursement in respect of any monies so
paid, and if so, to what extent ?125
Without comment, the court held in the affirmative as to the first ques-
tion. As to the second question, it held that the trustee had a right to reim-
bursement for taxes which it might pay but was under no obligation to assert
it against the trust or the estate.1 26
The decision of the Supreme Court of Ontario was subject to appeal to
the Court of Appeal for Ontario and ultimately to the Supreme Court of
Canada; however, a settlement was reached with 010.
In the Harron case, the lower Canadian court may have been willing in-
directly to help the United States enforce its tax judgment because it was
121. Id.
122. Brief for Respondent, The Trustees of the Toronto General Hospital, at 3.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Record at 9.
125. Id. at 1.
126. It re Harron (Ont. Sup. Ct., June 23, 1965) (unreported decision).
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impressed with the unfairness of a situation which allowed 010 to threaten
the trustee's carrying on business in the United States and to place it in a
position where its personal assets could be levied upon although it might not
have a right to reimbursement from the estate. In light of the general policy
that foreign tax judgments will not be enforced, what the final result would
have been had the case been appealed is a matter of conjecture. The Harron
decision may forecast the result in a number of cases arising in foieign coun-
tries in which beneficiaries who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States will refuse to grant fiduciaries of foreign-asset estates permis-
sion to satisfy United States taxes, citing basic tenets of internatiofial law.
Assuming the fiduciary is denied reimbursement by the foreign court, if a
fiduciary were held to personal liability by the Service, the fiduciary might
have no right of recourse against the estate. And it has been seen that thus
far the Seryice cannot be relied upon voluntarily to refrain from pressing
personal liability claims against a fiduciary until it is shown that the fiduciary
is entitled to reimbursement from the estate under foreign law. Regardless of
countless statements made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as to
the importance of large questions of tax policy over the collection of reve-
nue,127 the Service has not yet demonstrated restraint in exercising its inter-
national tax collecting powers against foreign fiduciaries.
V. A PRoPosAL
Judicial approval of the use of the New York long-arm statute against
nonresidents in tax cases means that the Service now has a new and potent
device to obtain increased jurisdiction over foreign fiduciaries, basing such
jurisdiction on the business transacted by the decedent, or his agents, in the
United States during his life. A twofold problem results from this develop-
ment.
It is not clear that it is wise for the Service to have its newly attained
power. International tax collection is a most delicate matter.128 The Service's
record to date does not insure that it will distinguish a foreign fiduciary who
is faced with a real dilemma from the nonresident taxpayer who is merely
attempting to evade paying taxes. 2 9 A keener awareness by 010 and foreign
fiduciaries of foreign asset estates of the unique problems involved in tax col-
lection may alleviate this problem. If so, it does not make sense to tie the
Service's expanded powers against nonresidents to state long-arm statutes.
Employing state long-arm statutes will mean a clear absence of uniformity.
127. See, e.g., Cohen, New IRS Philosophy, TRIAL, Aug./Sept. 1967, at 58; Cohen,
Current Developments in the Chief Counsel's Office, 42 TAXEs 663 (1964).
128. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
129. Cf. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). Justice Douglas, concurring,
states: "Resort to litigation rather than to Congress, for a change in the law is too often
the temptation of government which has a longer purse and more endurance than any
taxpayer." Id. at 307.
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The long-arm statute in each state (if there is one at all) will be worded
differently from others and be subject to the varying interpretations of state
courts.130 The policies and constitutional problems underlying the interpreta-
tion of the statutory language will vary as between domestic problems and
international problems-state problems and purely federal problems. Due
process requirements in international tax collection-will not always be equiva-
lent with the due process requirements imposed on the states.' 3' The drafts-
men of long-arm statutes never intended to have them applicable in the area
of international tax collection, and the statutes are not drawn with this end
in mind. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that the draftsmen of amended Rule 4
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intended to allow the use of state
long-arm statutes in such cases.
A Federal long-arm type statute specifically designed to gain jurisdic-
tion for the Service abroad is the necessary response. So long as there is a
reasonable basis for imposing tax on an individual, his acts in the United
States or even his mere failure to file tax returns in the United States during
his life could be support for jurisdiction over his estate at death. The drafts-
men of a federal statute might also consider the desirability of attempting to
gain personal jurisdiction over a foreign fiduciary on its act of administering
the estate in the United States, or even on its mere failure to file tax returns
and pay the taxes owed by the estate in the United States. Whether it would
be constitutional to say that such inaction on the part of a foreign fiduciary
constituted a sufficient contact with the United States for jurisdictional pur-
poses under a federal statute appears to be an open question. But the statute
could be designed to provide relief to the fiduciary by granting it the oppor-
tunity to seek instructions from the foreign court. If the foreign court deter-
mined that foreign law prevented the fiduciary from paying taxes to the
United States, such a decision rendered by the highest foreign court of the
country could absolve the fiduciary of any tax obligation. Perhaps 010 could
bear the costs involved in such litigation. If the estate were found free from
liability to the United States by the foreign court, a transferee subject to
United States jurisdiction should be liable for only a pro rata share of the
taxes due if he can show that under foreign law he would be denied reim-
bursement from the estate.
Considering Congress' recent willingness to legislate to expand the power
130. See Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 461-62, 209 N.E.2d 68, 7778, 261
N.Y.S.2d 8, 21-22, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965). In 1966 section 302 was gmended
to overturn this case which interpreted subdivision (a) (2) of CPLR 302 as providing in
personam jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries only when a tortious act was committed
within the state.
131. Cf. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965). Justice Harlan,
dissenting, termed the possibility that the New York court would interpret CPLR
§ 302(a) to give personal jurisdiction over Omar, who merely traded long distance for
his own account on the New York exchanges, a "glib assumption." Id. at 391-92.
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to tax under the Expatriation Act 3 2 so as to bring within the taxing frame-
work former Americans who divest themselves of citizenship to escape tax,
Congress should be sympathetic to legislation which would implement the
collection of taxes due from abroad and at the same time foster good relations
with other nations.
132. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 877, 2107.
